How Chinese Politics Works: By Deng’s Former Translator

A heavy-hitting interview seldom seen in the Western world. Professor Zhang Weiwei opens up about Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and the granular details of how Chinese politics actually works

By Zhang Weiwei and Gita Wirjawan

Is democracy the only road to national development and human well-being, or is it simply one governance model among many? How did nations achieve historic economic leaps and lasting social stability without copying Western-style systems? As the simplistic “democracy vs. autocracy” binary fails to explain our complex world, is it time to re-examine the political models we so easily dismiss?

The answers may lie in the unique perspective of Professor Zhang Weiwei, Director of the China Institute at Fudan University. In his early career, Zhang served as an English translator for top Chinese leaders, including Deng Xiaoping and Li Peng. Decades of research in international relations and comparative politics have taken him across the globe. Through relentless dialogue with mainstream Western narratives, he developed a systematic framework for understanding the “China Model.” Zhang argues that China’s rise proves a nation can achieve massive modernization and uplift its citizens by rooting itself in its own civilization, continuous self-correction, and pragmatic governance—without ever needing a foreign political template.

Professor Zhang recently joined Endgame, a video podcast hosted by Gita Wirjawan, Chairman of Ancora Group and Indonesia’s former Minister of Trade, to discuss these pressing global issues through the lens of his personal journey.

Video screenshot: “Leaders Must Deliver, Meet Demands of the People” - Zhang Weiwei | Endgame #268

The Reform Era: How Beijing Rewrote the China Narrative

Gita Wirjawan: I have heard so much about you, and I have had the honor of speaking with other Chinese scholars. I am very curious about your views on a variety of subjects. But first, I would like to ask about how you grew up in Shanghai and how you made the decision to go to Geneva and then explore the world.

Zhang Weiwei: I experienced the Cultural Revolution. At that time, Chairman Mao felt that Chinese youth were losing their revolutionary zeal. So he decided to abolish the college entrance exam, which had been practiced for many years and is deeply rooted in the long Confucian tradition of examinations. After high school, I was sent to a factory. That was Chairman Mao’s instruction: young people should first go to the countryside, to factories, or to the army to be tempered, to sharpen their minds and courage, and to become more revolutionary.

I worked in a jade carving factory in Shanghai as an apprentice for exactly three years. Then, all of a sudden, Deng Xiaoping returned to power. He announced the restoration of the college entrance examinations. I applied to Fudan University and was enrolled in the foreign languages department, majoring in English and American literature. That is how I began my college education and later became a senior interpreter in China.

I took the exam in 1977, a cohort that later became known as the “Class of ’77” (and essentially the Class of ’78 as well, since there had been no college entrance exams during the ten years of the Cultural Revolution). When the exams were restored, the competition was fierce. Depending on the province, the enrollment rate was roughly 1% to 5%. We were the lucky ones admitted to universities to receive a formal college education.

Ultimately, these two classes (’77 and ’78) played a pivotal role in China’s transformation. Many of their members are among China’s top leadership today. For me, although I was working as a jade carving apprentice—a very tough but also artistic job—my real passion was foreign languages. I began learning English, French, and Japanese through radio programs. I found that many of my schoolmates from the Classes of ’77 and ’78 were also self-taught students who had worked very hard on their own, as no one expected the exams to return. This unique generation was tempered in the countryside, in factories, and in the military.

Later, I went to Geneva to work for the United Nations as a simultaneous interpreter. While doing so, my hobby was pursuing academic studies, specifically political science and international relations, with a focus on the rise of China. Having worked for China’s top leadership for five years, I wanted to summarize what China had done—to distill both the successful and unsuccessful experiences. Ultimately, this led to the study of the “China model,” which I was among the earliest scholars to discuss in the 1980s and 1990s.

While studying at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, I also traveled extensively. I had a dream of traveling to 100 countries. By 2006, I had completed this ambitious goal, visiting 106 countries. This aligns with a well-known Chinese saying: “Read 10,000 books and travel 10,000 miles.” The idea is to combine book knowledge with practical experience, giving you a genuine overall grasp of societal trends and forces on every continent.

Gita Wirjawan: Amazing. Tell us a little bit about your experiences with His Excellency, the late Li Peng, and the late Deng Xiaoping. That must have been something else. We are talking about two giant personalities who helped shape—or reshape—the narrative of China, making it so consequential to humanity across the world.

Zhang Weiwei: Deng Xiaoping was, of course, an extraordinary leader—a statesman, not just a politician. What impressed me most was his vision for the future of China and the world. When I began working for him, he was already in his eighties, but he spoke confidently about China in the next 20, 30, 40, and even 50 years.

At that time, he was discussing the idea of quadrupling China’s economy from its 1980 level by the year 2000. He stated that by the middle of the next century, China should become a fully developed country. I remember he spoke with Li Peng and said, “If our economy is to quadruple, what will be the required power supply? You have to work on this: if the economy grows by such a percentage, how much must our power capacity increase?” As a result of this long-term vision and execution, China today is one of the safest countries in terms of energy and power supply, despite the crises in the Middle East.

Furthermore, Deng’s slogan—which was also Chairman Mao’s—was “seeking truth from facts.” You do not govern from dogmas, whether they come from the East or the West. Guided by this philosophical framework, he pursued reform and the open-door policy.

There is a famous saying from Confucianism: “Water can carry the boat, but it can also overturn the boat.” The boat represents power and top leadership, while the water represents the people. A top leader must feel the pulse of society, understand the people, and guide them toward their objective of a better life. That is exactly what Deng Xiaoping did in 1978.

Later, as a scholar, I studied his theoretical arguments and concluded that at three critical moments in Chinese history, Deng Xiaoping made three strategic decisions that changed China forever.

The first was in 1978, when he decided to open up China and carry out economic reforms. There were other choices at the time, but he chose to embrace something entirely new. In 1978, he visited Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Japan. He found that they were more developed. He had visited Singapore back in 1920 on his way to France, and at that time, it was a very poor village. Seeing it again in 1978, he was deeply impressed. He said we should learn from Singapore, but added, “We should try to see whether we can do better.” This is the vision of Chinese leadership: recognizing that we are behind, learning from others, and eventually striving to do better.

I shared this story with Kishore Mahbubani, my great friend from Singapore, and he said, “That’s the reason why the West is afraid of China. When you are from an age-old civilization that used to be at the top of the world, it is so natural to ask, ‘Can we do better?’”

Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping greets Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew during his official visit to Singapore, November 12–14, 1978

Gita Wirjawan: I have a few follow-up questions. If we go back to the five-year plans set up in the early 1950s, Chairman Mao designed plans for China to catch up with the United States. But what you witnessed in 1978 was the audacity and conviction with which Deng was adamant about opening up China. Looking back, are you surprised by how quickly China has grown?

Zhang Weiwei: Indeed. From today’s perspective, I divide modern China into two periods: the period under Mao and the period since Deng Xiaoping.

The first three decades under Mao laid an important foundation for China’s economic takeoff. Whatever mistakes were made, China established a very solid base. The literacy campaign was highly successful, a basic public health system was created, women’s liberation was completed, and land reform was carried out. I have visited India five times, and I saw that India’s problem is that it never had a social revolution to lay this kind of foundation. For a developing country, without land reform, peasants cannot become economically better off. Without women’s liberation, the wisdom of half the population cannot be brought into play.

In the First Five-Year Plan, China tried hard to learn from the Soviet Union. Soviet experts said China’s economic foundation was too weak and that the plan was too ambitious. But Mao insisted we had to be ambitious and establish every branch of industry, with a priority on heavy industry. This was understandable because China was fighting the United States in the Korean War. They learned the hard lesson that without heavy industry and enough steel, you are humiliated on the battlefield.

Yet China was still very poor when Deng Xiaoping came to power. The World Bank sent a team to study China’s GDP—a metric China had not previously used. The conclusion was stark: China’s per capita GDP was lower than that of most African countries and definitely lower than most ASEAN countries. The question arose whether China should make this public. Deng said, “Of course, make it public. If you are not handsome, just admit you are not handsome. Don’t worry.” He faced reality squarely, while maintaining confidence that China could catch up.

From that starting point in 1978, China achieved what I call “leapfrog development.” We completed four industrial revolutions in one.

China missed the first industrial revolution (coal-based, light industry) and the second (power-based, heavy industry), which were led by Europe and the United States. However, beginning in 1978, China completed the first industrial revolution in one decade, becoming the largest textile producer and exporter. Ten years later, China’s power generation surpassed that of the United States, fully demonstrating the development of both heavy and light industries.

For the third industrial revolution—the internet revolution—China not only caught up but became a leader. Today, the top 20 internet and telecommunication companies are either Chinese or American. In the fourth industrial revolution (AI, big data, quantum technologies), China is definitely at the frontier and perhaps slightly ahead of the United States. An Australian Strategic Policy Institute report noted that, out of 64 critical technologies, China leads the United States in 57.

So yes, even for the Chinese, it is deeply impressive to see how China traversed, in a few decades, what took European countries two to three hundred years to complete.

Gita Wirjawan: It is an amazing story. What do you think were some of the structural risks that Chairman Deng calculated but believed he could manage? For example, opening up a nation and sending over 9 million people across the world to study—mostly STEM in Europe, the US, and Japan—to help catapult China’s industrialization. What risks did they foresee in 1978?

A Turning Point: Students take the National College Entrance Examination (Gaokao) in 1977, marking the resumption of higher education after the Cultural Revolution.

Zhang Weiwei: Opening China to the outside world, especially to the West, was indeed a risky strategy. In the late 1970s, when Deng decided we should send students to the West to learn science and technology, there was a real concern that a “brain drain” would occur. But Deng said something with incredible courage and long-term vision: “Don’t worry. If even one out of ten returns to China, our policy of sending students abroad will be a success.”

I was once in Washington, D.C., with Li Peng when he was Vice Premier. We had dinner with George H. W. Bush, who was then Vice President. Bush had previously served as the director of the US liaison office in Beijing, and he asked Deng Xiaoping how many students China would allow to go abroad. Deng replied, “No limit.” Because of the Cultural Revolution, there was a sharp shortage of trained experts, scientists, and technicians, and Deng was in a hurry to catch up.

In the long term, this “brain drain” became a “brain gain.” As you mentioned, now about 85% to 90% of students return home. Many more would like to return, though there are practical challenges for older generations regarding issues such as medical insurance. But on the whole, the trend of returning to China is firmly established.

Gita Wirjawan: What made him decide to send disproportionately more students to study STEM? It turned out to be a stroke of genius for industrializing China, and this is something Southeast Asia is currently lacking.

Zhang Weiwei: I describe China as a “civilizational state”—an amalgam of an age-old civilization and modernity. Historically, Confucius advocated “education for all, irrespective of class.” This tradition has existed for 2,500 years. Since 1949, Chairman Mao, Deng Xiaoping, and all top Chinese leaders have given priority to STEM education.

From the early 1950s, the national slogan was “Advance in science and technology.”As a result, even today, China is perhaps the only country in the world where most high school students strongly prefer to study STEM. When Deng realized that the Cultural Revolution had disrupted this education, he knew we had to make up for those losses by sending students abroad.

It was a combination of China’s historical reverence for education and the modern prioritization of science and technology. China has a long history. Over 2,500 years ago, Confucius advocated for “education for all without discrimination,” asserting that learning belongs to everyone regardless of wealth or status. Since 1949, a new tradition has emerged as education heavily pivoted toward STEM fields.

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Gita Wirjawan: One vivid cultural element of China is the desire to work hard. I compare the entrepreneurialism in Silicon Valley—which sits at the intersection of academic excellence and entrepreneurship—to Shenzhen. In Shenzhen, you find entrepreneurs who have migrated from other cities. If they worked eight hours a day in Wuhan, they move to Shenzhen and desire to work 12 to 14 hours a day to make things cheaper, better, and faster. How do you get a nation to attain that sort of mentality?

Zhang Weiwei: You are describing our internal competition, which is fierce, but the Chinese are used to it. The primary test of this competition is the college entrance exam. It is fair to all; regardless of your family background, your score determines which university you enter. With China’s reform and opening up, going to university became just one channel. There are many other open pathways to success.

Many entrepreneurs who were not highly educated have become very successful businesspeople. They are full of entrepreneurial spirit, which has much to do with Chinese cultural tradition. In the Chinese language, every word or idiom related to working—working hard, working diligently, working day and night—is positive. Chinese people are undeniably among the most industrious in the world.

I strongly dislike Western propaganda that claims Chinese people lack innovative capacity and rely purely on rote memory. Seeking truth from facts: this is a civilization that was ahead of Europe for thousands of years. Up to the early 19th century, China was the largest economy in the world and contributed thousands of inventions. Western media coverage of China, the Islamic world, and Russia is heavily stereotyped. But we do not care. Eventually, they will realize that China is a vast country with limitless capacity for innovation.

Beyond 'Democracy vs. Autocracy': The Shift to Good vs. Bad Governance

Gita Wirjawan: I can speak of the EV space, which has nearly 100 brands in China. That is true democratization of a market, and it means fierce bloodshed among competitors. This intense competitive landscape allows for greater technological innovation.

Putting this in the context of China and Southeast Asia: over the last 30 years, China’s economic growth has been roughly 10 times, whereas Southeast Asia’s has been about 2.7 times. This is underpinned by infrastructure, education (China placing more universities in the global top 20), governance (recruiting based on meritocracy rather than patronage), and sheer competitiveness. How can people around the world better understand how to pick up speed and catch up with what China has done?

Zhang Weiwei: The Chinese model of modernization is unique in several ways. Politically, it operates under what I call a “holistic interest party.” From a civilizational perspective, China was unified in 221 BC, and for most of its history, it has been ruled by a unified entity; otherwise, the country would disintegrate. This unified ruling entity was backed by a system of meritocracy, starting with the keju (civil service exam) system, invented during the Sui Dynasty over 1,500 years ago.

If the Western system is called “election,” the Chinese system is “selection plus election.” Selection always comes first, based on performance at different levels of governance. If you look at the top echelon of Chinese leadership—the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau—most members have worked as the “number one” leader (Party Secretary or Governor) of multiple provinces, governing more than 100 million people before reaching their current positions. President Xi Jinping, for instance, governed Fujian, Zhejiang, and Shanghai. By the time he became top leader, he had governed populations and economies larger than many major countries.

Economically, China has a mixed economy, officially described as a “socialist market economy.” State planning and market forces are combined organically. Take digital infrastructure: the state sector is responsible for ensuring that 4G and 5G reach every remote village, regardless of cost. That is the mission of socialism. Then private companies make the best use of this first-rate infrastructure.

In President Xi Jinping’s economic thinking, sometimes supply creates demand. With first-rate digital infrastructure, high-speed trains, and highways, a dynamic new economy emerges. The EV sector is also a product of this mixed economy. The state planned for EVs 20 years ago through five-year plans. Private companies joined in, resulting in fierce domestic competition. In the end, the most successful firms became internationally competitive.

Because of our super-large market, we can test every technological path—lithium batteries, hydrogen energy, and so on—select the best ones, and then channel resources to support them.

Socially, we encourage positive interaction between the state and society, rather than pitting society against the state.

Next-Gen Manufacturing: The automated production line inside the Xiaomi EV factory in Beijing. Photo| Xinhua

Gita Wirjawan: Would you argue that the harmony between the state and society reflects the accountability of the leadership to the people? This seems to help democratize public goods, whereas in some democracies, accountability is geared more toward certain class structures, resulting in deficient distribution of public goods.

Zhang Weiwei: Yes. In terms of theoretical construction, I have argued for years that the Western political science paradigm of “democracy versus autocracy” is outdated and entirely wrong. It is used to encourage color revolutions and regime changes. I advocate shifting to a new paradigm: “good governance versus bad governance.”

When debating my Western counterparts, they say, “As a Chinese, you dare not discuss democracy.” I tell them, no, we are discussing real democracy. In Chinese cultural tradition, we divide everything into Dao (overall objectives or purpose) and Shu (specific procedures). In the Western paradigm, democracy is defined entirely by Shu—based on Joseph Schumpeter’s 1942 formula of electing leaders by votes. To us, this is merely procedural democracy.

We must first establish the Dao. What is the objective of democracy? It is good governance. The state must deliver; leaders must deliver and meet the demands of the people.

In the early 1980s, Deng Xiaoping laid out three criteria to judge whether a political system is good:

1. Can it ensure political stability?

2. Does it keep improving people’s living standards and maintain unity?

3. Does it keep productivity moving ahead?

This is an approach that starts with the Dao—the foundational vision and ultimate objectives—and then shapes formal democracy by blending it with China’s unique traditions and institutional frameworks. Take the Premier’s Government Work Report delivered every March during the National “Two Sessions.” Almost every single sentence directly impacts the livelihoods of millions. The content is hyper-concrete: it lays bare exactly what was promised last year and precisely what was delivered this year. Contrast this with a U.S. State of the Union address, which often reads like a campaign stump speech. The sheer pragmatism of China’s report underscores a profound difference in the quality of decision-making.

The Five-Year Plan system is another prime example of this highly mature governance architecture. It is an all-encompassing matrix: master blueprints for socio-economic development, spatial planning for agricultural and conservation zones, and hyper-targeted strategies for frontier sectors like AI and electric vehicles. These plans cascade from the central government down through provincial, municipal, and county levels. Crucially, they are forged through tens of thousands of consultations—within the Party, across political coalitions, among think tanks, and right down to public debates on the internet. Any everyday citizen, like myself living in Shanghai, can easily look up the local plan to see exactly where a new metro line will open or a new park will be built over the next five years. Supply creates its own demand, economic activity naturally aligns, and this collective foresight becomes an ordinary part of daily life in China.

Ultimately, democracy must be judged by the tangible results it delivers to the people. That is the core metric. Throughout his entire life, Deng Xiaoping loathed nothing more than empty talk that fails the nation.

Connecting the Yangtze Delta: A bullet train runs along the Shanghai-Suzhou-Huzhou High-Speed Railway.

Gita Wirjawan: Do you think China’s current system has developed enough “inertia”—meaning it is now quite resistant to sliding in the wrong direction in the future? Whether viewed through the lens of its underlying “Dao” (philosophical principles) or the way it distributes public goods, is it unlikely to regress? That’s my first follow-up question.

My second follow-up is this: considering our friends in democratic countries, how do you think they can move from procedural democracy toward a different form of democracy that more effectively distributes public goods?

Zhang Weiwei: On your first question—whether there is sufficient “inertia.” Yes, there is, and that’s normal. Some people always perform better and work harder, while others are less successful. The key lies in a distinctive feature of the Chinese economy: intense internal competition between counties.

China has a five-tier government structure—central, provincial, municipal, county, and township. Local governments at every level compete with one another. Take the provincial level: Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang are all in the Yangtze River Delta. Together, their GDP (at official exchange rates) already exceeds that of Japan or Germany, yet they continue to compete fiercely with each other. You could call it healthy competition, but the pressure is very real.

The county is the most basic administrative unit. In many respects, it functions like a “mini-state.” A county party secretary or county magistrate has to oversee political, economic, social, foreign trade, and even military-related affairs. There’s an old Chinese saying: “Prime ministers must emerge from the prefectures and counties.” That principle still holds true today. Every official who has served as Premier of the State Council has had extensive experience working at the grassroots level.Every year, governments at all levels rank counties and make the results public. Officials who engage in lazy governance, inaction, or poor performance face enormous pressure and may even be removed from office. So they have no choice but to improve.

Of course, the 80/20 rule is universal—20% of people, enterprises, or entities create 80% of the results. That’s a natural law. But because of this competitive mechanism, the entire country has become extraordinarily competitive.

The Genetic Flaws of Western Political Systems

Gita Wirjawan: So, on the second question: how can Western procedural democracy shift toward a less procedural form of democracy that places greater emphasis on the effective delivery of public goods?

Zhang Weiwei: For those countries that have already adopted the Western political model—multi-party competition and universal suffrage—it is their own choice. The problem is that the Western system was never designed with “development” as a core objective. Its implicit assumption is that once a country installs Western-style political institutions, it will automatically become developed and its economy will flourish.Reality has proven the opposite.

Many countries have fallen into chaos, stagnation, and endless problems. Politicians exploit populism, governance deteriorates, and development stalls. That is why I propose a new paradigm: good governance versus bad governance. Western systems can produce good governance, but non-Western systems can too—China is a clear example. Conversely, bad governance can appear under both Western and non-Western systems. I could easily list a hundred such cases. This is why we must move beyond the Western political model.

I often discuss this with friends from developing countries. Chinese philosophy teaches us that when facing a multitude of problems and contradictions, we must identify and grasp the principal contradiction.

You mentioned that ASEAN countries face challenges in education, competitiveness, infrastructure, and more. But it is often very difficult—and sometimes counterproductive—to tackle everything at once. You need to seize the key issue first, get the whole situation moving in the right direction, and then address the rest.

Deng Xiaoping believed that without long-term stability, China’s modernization would be unimaginable. The biggest flaw of the Western political model is that it struggles to formulate and execute long-term plans. Either there is no plan at all, or when a new party comes to power, it discards the previous one’s plans.

So I often ask: for countries that have adopted the Western model, is it possible for them to forge a long-term national vision through thorough cross-party discussion and genuine consensus? Ideally, this vision could be enshrined in the constitution and taught in school and university textbooks—something like “national rejuvenation” or another overarching goal. Whichever party is in power would then continue advancing along this shared path. Without such continuity, progress is extremely difficult.

Deng Xiaoping once said that a vast country like China needs a century of stability; otherwise, it has no chance. What China pursues, therefore, is stability, unity, and the continuous improvement of the people’s living standards.

Gita Wirjawan: Do you think the political cyclicality and inability to think long-term in the West are fundamental reasons why universal suffrage has not worked the way they intended? Did they fail because universalism cannot be applied the way a single nation wants to globalize it?

Zhang Weiwei: First, I do not think there is such a thing as Western “universalism.” True universalism should be based on the core message of the Chinese experience: every country must find its own path to success in light of its own national conditions. Forcing a Western model onto developing countries is sometimes suicidal.

This reminds me of my debate with Professor Francis Fukuyama exactly 15 years ago, in June 2011. At the time, the Arab Spring was unfolding. He saw it as a manifestation of the “End of History,” arguing that even Arab peoples wanted to embrace Western-style democracy. He told me China must undergo political reform or experience its own Arab Spring.I said, “No chance.”

I told him that, based on my knowledge of the region, the Arab Spring would soon become an Arab Winter. In Chinese wisdom, a system must be adapted to local “soil and water” (cultural, political, and economic conditions). A Western prescription for Egypt, Syria, or Yemen would naturally end in disaster.

I also told him face-to-face: “Make sure the United States carries out its own political reform. It is more urgent than China’s. My concern is that without substantial political reform, you may elect a leader worse than George W. Bush.”

The Western political model has genetic flaws. It relies on the assumption of a “rational voter,” but with money politics, social media, and AI, rational thinking is marginalized and populism prevails. Furthermore, the West treats rights as absolute, whereas Chinese philosophy insists that rights and responsibilities must go hand in hand.

I warned him that the Western model would end in extreme, low-minded populism before it destroys the West itself. Later, Professor Jeffrey Sachs told me I had won that debate.

Gita Wirjawan: Why do you think the United States never developed a geostrategic plan that anticipated its own relative decline? It seems they never even tried. It’s obvious that America is declining in both economic power and geopolitical influence. One would intuitively expect smart strategists to have foreseen this two or three decades ago, especially against the backdrop of China’s and other countries’ rise.

Zhang Weiwei: Chinese philosophy emphasizes seeking truth from facts. When China was lagging behind the West and the United States, we made a conscious effort to learn everything positive and useful from them. That’s why we sent millions of students abroad—not just to study science and engineering, but also other disciplines. I myself studied political science and international relations in Geneva. All these experiences have been valuable.

The problem, however, lies in the way Western political systems are structured. As I said earlier, elections are essentially about performance and showmanship rather than actual governance. It’s not leadership; it’s theater.

This is a fundamental flaw of the Western political system—what I call a genetic defect. As for whether they can overcome this inherited illness, I remain skeptical.

Even George Kennan, one of the chief architects of the Cold War, once said that for America to defeat the Soviet Union, it must first ensure it is doing very well at home. Do you remember the famous 1959 Kitchen Debate between Nixon and Khrushchev? At that time, the United States clearly won in terms of improving people’s living standards. The Soviet Union ultimately collapsed largely because it lost economic competitiveness.

From Deng Xiaoping’s perspective, this was the key lesson. That’s why he insisted China must focus on the people’s livelihood and become a successful economic model. Today, China’s average life expectancy has surpassed that of the United States, and per capita daily intake of protein and vegetables has also exceeded America’s. This represents a fundamental shift.

Gita Wirjawan: Looking at history, the United States has only existed for about 250 years, yet it seems to possess an inherent capacity for self-reinvention. Some people believe America will eventually rise again at some point. Do you think this view is accurate?

Zhang Weiwei: Many people say so, but I tend to be more cautious. All empires have their cycles, and from a historical perspective, 250 years is roughly the maximum lifespan of most empires.

Look at America’s long-standing, unresolved problems. As early as Sun Yat-sen’s Xinhai Revolution in China, the United States was already talking about universal healthcare—yet more than a century later, it still hasn’t achieved it. On gun control, countless people emphasize its importance, but nothing gets done. The political system has become one that is incapable of solving its own problems.

I advocate for a balance between political power, social power, and capital power that favors the vast majority of the people. The Chinese model achieves this. The American model, by contrast, favors a tiny minority and empowers capital. Lobbying groups have become institutionalized and deeply entrenched, and there seems to be no effective way to truly constrain or check them.

China-ASEAN: A Promising Model for a Future Multipolar World Order

Gita Wirjawan: Yes, especially when we look not just at income inequality but at wealth inequality—where 1% of the population controls a disproportionately huge share of the economy. That’s really unhealthy.

I’d like to go back to what you mentioned earlier about China’s vision of globalization. Intuitively, it seems China wants a pluralistic form of globalization—one that advances cooperation while respecting the cultures of its partners. Looking at trade data from recent years, China’s exports to the United States have fallen from 23% to around 12-13% of its total exports.

To me, this reflects a deliberate strategic shift toward greater focus on the Global South. I myself come from the Global South, which accounts for 84% of the world’s population—about 7 billion people. China is investing in these 7 billion, and these 7 billion are also investing in China’s 1.4 billion.How do you see pluralism effectively ensuring that this cooperation enables the Global South to move upward—not only in global value chains but also in the global geopolitical order—while expanding their existing strategic autonomy?

Zhang Weiwei: First, on globalization: we’re seeing a clear trend of de-globalization in the West, both in Europe and the United States. But in my view, the U.S. and the West benefited enormously from globalization. The real problem lies in unfair domestic distribution—the big corporations captured most of the profits without sharing them with ordinary people.

China, overall, has been a major beneficiary of globalization. Even though companies like Microsoft and Apple took 80-90% of the profits while Chinese workers received less than 10%, that 10% still dramatically improved the lives of those workers. So most Chinese people still embrace globalization. But if the United States chooses to reject it, there’s little we can do.

China launched the Belt and Road Initiative about 13 or 14 years ago. Today it has become the world’s largest platform for shared development, with Southeast Asia and ASEAN as a key region. I’m very pleased about this, because Southeast Asia has enormous infrastructure needs that have been neglected for a long time—whether in Western political systems or in institutions like the United Nations.

The BRI has already invested over $2 trillion and involves more than 150 countries. That’s a very positive sign. Though you’re being modest about ASEAN, I can say that China-ASEAN cooperation has been far more successful than U.S.-EU cooperation.

There are three main pillars in China-ASEAN relations: First, development—both sides put improving people’s livelihoods at the top of the agenda. Second, security—China supports ASEAN as a driver of change, for example on issues like nuclear-free zones. Third, cultural and civilizational dialogue. We talk about ASEAN wisdom, Chinese wisdom, and Asian wisdom—strategic patience, two steps forward and one step back, resolving disputes through negotiation.

In contrast, look at what the U.S. and EU practice: excluding Russia, suppressing Germany, keeping America embedded in Europe. This NATO philosophy applied across Europe has not served European interests and has led to “lose-lose, multi-lose” outcomes.In Asia, particularly with China and ASEAN together representing 2 billion people, we have achieved “win-win, multi-win” results. I hope this trend continues. I even believe this could serve as an excellent model for a new multipolar world order.

The world is changing at a fascinating speed. We are moving from unipolarity to multipolarity. The BRICS countries now have 11 members, accounting for 40% of global GDP—surpassing the G7’s 30%. At the same time, we are shifting from a single civilization to multiple civilizations. More and more countries are describing themselves as “civilization-states.”

I think Indonesia could eventually claim this title too. With its thousand-year history, Islamic, Chinese, and Western civilizations coexist harmoniously within it. That’s very important. Ultimately, I believe ASEAN also needs a higher “Dao”—to build a “civilization-type community.” Only with such a “Dao” can it more easily solve “Shu” issues—procedural and specific practical problems.

Gita Wirjawan: Let me return to the Global South, of which Southeast Asia is a part (though Singapore and Brunei are developed economies and exceptions). There’s a political-economy argument here: for Global South members, cooperation remains limited if they cannot obtain technology transfer from China. But if technology transfer occurs, they can move up value chains and in the global geopolitical order, making cooperation virtually limitless. I think this provides a compelling rationale for deeper, sustained China-Global South cooperation. Is this a logical extension of your thinking?

Zhang Weiwei: China’s guiding principle for the Belt and Road is “extensive consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits.” Joint contribution and shared benefits naturally include sharing technological knowledge, but it must be mutually beneficial and win-win. Most Chinese companies working on BRI projects today are private enterprises. For projects to succeed, they need commercial incentives; they can’t be driven solely by state-owned firms.

I remember in 1978 or 1979 in Shanghai, China wanted to import elevator technology from Switzerland’s Schindler. The Swiss company said it would transfer the technology but required a fair and reasonable price. China agreed, and they shipped over a large volume of German-language documents.

The fact that we were able to receive and translate those documents shows how important the foundation laid in the first thirty years under Mao was. We had trained enough German-speaking translators and enough engineers who, even if their language wasn’t perfect, could understand the blueprints and designs. So local cultivation of technological capability is crucial.I think many things have to be done step by step.

When Deng Xiaoping met Western visitors, he would say: if you transfer technology to China, you will ultimately benefit too, because you will create a larger market and more consumers. This is win-win. We should view issues this way. You can discuss each side’s considerations with Chinese companies and find common ground.China has trained a great many talents. I visit Africa once or twice a year. During the Sino-Soviet honeymoon in the 1950s, the Soviet Union helped train about 20,000 Chinese engineers and scientists, who played a vital role in China’s development.

China has now trained even more for Africa—probably 40,000 to 50,000 engineers and scientists—and the process continues. How best to utilize these talents trained in China is also very important. Human capital development is a key component of the Belt and Road framework.

Global South Synergy: Students practice operating robotic arms via computer at the Luban Workshop inside the Musanze Technical College in Northern Province, Rwanda. Photo| Xinhua

Gita Wirjawan: Exactly right. Let me add one point: in most Southeast Asian countries, 80-90% of household heads have not received university education. Their only hope is real investment in good teachers. When parents themselves are not highly educated, choosing good teachers becomes critical.I’ve spent time teaching in classrooms myself and know how important scalable education is.

I firmly believe that investing in teachers—investing in excellent teachers—is exactly what Deng Xiaoping, Lee Kuan Yew, and other great leaders did. This is where Southeast Asia needs to strengthen significantly (Singapore being the exception, as it has consistently invested in quality teachers since the early 1960s).

Zhang Weiwei: Perhaps China and the United States could engage in far broader cooperation in education and various training programs. Another important aspect of education is vocational training. For example, when we helped Laos build its railway, Shanghai’s railway vocational technical school trained many local technicians. They learned very well, and after the project was completed, many operational roles were taken over by Laotian engineers and workers. This shows the real impact of technology training embedded in Chinese projects—it’s very effective.

Gita Wirjawan: I also believe Southeast Asia must step up its investment in education, because the economic disparities within the region are huge—there are countries with per capita income of $91,000 and others with less than $2,000. I think this is largely due to vast differences in education levels, and this gap needs to be addressed. Perhaps this is an area where China can play a helpful role—whether in vocational education, higher education, or overall educational assistance. China has done an outstanding job of making education a priority.

Zhang Weiwei: Yes, I think the space for educational cooperation is enormous. As university professors, we should encourage it. We are also sending young scholars to ASEAN countries as visiting researchers to learn about Asian culture and ASEAN nations. We hope more Chinese people will understand Southeast Asia. Overall, Chinese impressions of Southeast Asia are very positive.I recall what former Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji said at the signing ceremony of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement: “If, ten years later, our ASEAN friends find any part of the agreement unfair to ASEAN, we can renegotiate it.”

Gita Wirjawan: I remember that.

Zhang Weiwei: This is the Chinese civilization—broad-minded and generous. We are willing to help others, and we have accepted help from others. It has always been mutual, whether direct or indirect. Even with a country like the Philippines, which many Chinese feel is causing trouble, we take a longer-term view.

If it were the United States, it would have destroyed the Philippine navy long ago. But the Chinese have so far only used water cannons. Behind this is a long-term perspective: Philippine policy fluctuates, but the Filipino people are our friends. Of course, we also have our bottom lines.I believe that as civilization-states, China and the U.S. have profound cultural differences. For Americans, it’s either friend or enemy.

For Chinese, if not a friend today, it is a potential friend. This longer-term perspective is an important guarantee for maintaining peace in international relations.

Chinese Philosophy: You Are Either a Friend, or a Future Friend

Gita Wirjawan: I strongly believe Southeast Asia needs to invest heavily in education and great teachers, as China has done. My second-to-last question is about India. They opted out of the RCEP. How do you see China, ASEAN, and India collaborating better?

Zhang Weiwei: Broadly speaking, I share your assessment that a future matrix of cooperation between China, ASEAN, and India is entirely possible. However, the elephant in the room is the China-India bilateral relationship—specifically, how these two towering civilizations can find a sustainable modus vivendi. Based on my observations, the primary bottlenecks reside on the Indian side.

China harbors no structural hurdles. Our leadership consists of long-term strategists. While the border dispute remains our primary friction point, Beijing has consistently maintained that we can shelve these territorial disagreements to foster broader bilateral ties—or even shelve sovereignty disputes altogether in favor of joint development. As Deng Xiaoping famously noted, future generations may prove wiser than us and find the ultimate solution. China has consistently maintained this strategic flexibility, seeking pragmatic pathways for two ancient civilizations to navigate their differences.

India, however, faces two deep-seated domestic hurdles. First, the Indian military establishment remains haunted by the memory of the 1962 border conflict. Second, the Indian media ecosystem is hyper-hostile toward China. Given the military’s unique institutional leverage and the media’s massive sway over public opinion, bridging this gap will take time—unless a rare leader emerges who possesses both the vision and the political courage to break the deadlock. This is the geopolitical reality we must confront, and we hope Indonesia and other regional partners can help engage New Delhi productively.

The 1962 Border War: Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru shakes hands with frontline soldiers during the Sino-Indian border conflict.

From Beijing’s vantage point, the door is wide open. China has successfully settled border disputes with almost all its neighbors. Only India and Bhutan remain—and the dispute with Bhutan could realistically be resolved within 24 hours if New Delhi ceased its interference.

Furthermore, India must realize it has recently made a major strategic miscalculation. During the Gaza war, while Israel’s actions faced global condemnation, New Delhi chose to embrace Tel Aviv and forge a strategic partnership, hoping to curry favor with Donald Trump’s administration. The move backfired: it alienated the Arab world, and Trump remains largely transactional regarding India.

Success for a China-ASEAN-India cooperative triad will not come easily, and it hinges on India cultivating visionary statesmen to drive the initiative forward. But as far as China is concerned, the willingness is entirely there.

Gita Wirjawan: My last question: regarding the recent summit between President Xi and the US President, are we already in a Thucydides Trap? If so, can we get out of it peacefully?

Zhang Weiwei: The Thucydides Trap is based entirely on Western history and a zero-sum philosophy. Chinese philosophy emphasizes win-win outcomes. Unlike American culture, which views others as “friend or foe,” Chinese culture views others as “friends or potential friends.” It is a long-term game.

However, China also understands realpolitik. We state openly that we hope the United States will not provoke China over Taiwan. Taiwan is the red line of red lines. Even during the Cold War, when China was a hundred times weaker, we engaged in direct military confrontation with the US in the Korean and Vietnam Wars when our red lines were crossed. I think the current US leadership has gotten the message.

Eventually, the United States will have to come to terms with the reality of China’s rise. It is similar to the psychological model for a terminal patient going through the stages of grief: denial, anger, bargaining, and acceptance. They denied that China could rise; they became angry that a communist country was rising; now they are in the bargaining stage. In the end, they will accept it, and that acceptance is coming faster than many people expected.

Gita Wirjawan: I am with you on that one. This has been fascinating. Thank you so much, Weiwei, for your time and the discussion.

Zhang Weiwei: Could I add one more point? At the beginning, I mentioned that Deng Xiaoping made three strategic decisions, but I only explained the first one (the 1978 opening up).

To give you the complete picture of Deng’s contribution: his second major decision was in 1989, during a massive political crisis. He had the courage to stop a color revolution forcefully. Otherwise, China would have fractured just like the Soviet Union.

His third decision was in 1992, during his Southern Tour. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a huge domestic dispute over whether China should close its doors. Deng was in a hurry. He said the crisis was an opportunity, and he settled the debate over the “market economy.” He declared that the market is an ideologically neutral tool that can work for capitalism but can also work for socialism. This sparked an even larger scale of reform and opening up. Those three decisions at critical moments changed China forever. That is the China we see today.

Gita Wirjawan: I am sure he is quite pleased with how China has turned out. Thank you so much.

Zhang Weiwei: Thank you very much, Gita. Good luck! (End)

About the Author:

Zhang Weiwei is the Director of the China Institute at Fudan University. In his early career, he served as an English translator for top Chinese leaders, including Deng Xiaoping and Li Peng.

Gita Wirjawan is the host of the video podcast Endgame, as well as the Chairman of Ancora Group and Indonesia’s former Minister of Trade.